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Japanese Government Macro Policy: 
Failure in the 1920's, Success (of a sort) in the 1930 1 s* 
The Japanese historical case is often cited as an example of ac• 
tive and effective government stimulation of economic growth, by fos­
tering a market environment conducive to sustained expansion of output 
by private enterprise. The experience of the interwar period (between 
World Wars I and II) suggests, however, that such a generalization is 
too facile. In this essay I take up one aspect of the government's 
role. It is my contention that the Japanese governmentts muddled ob­
jective to retu~n to the gold standard at pre-World War I par, and the 
attend,"'""l.t deflationary fiscal and monetary policies taken in the 1920' s, 
were responsible for much of the retardation of growth in that decade. 
While the radical change in objectives, and concomitantly in fiscal 
and monetary policy, resulted in rapid growth from 1932 to 1936, and 
thereafter for a few more years, by then it was too late: the mili• 
tary were increasingly entrenched in control of the government, on the 
path toward the devastation of World War II. I thus focus upon govern­
ment macro policies in the fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate arenas, 
excluding other areas of government policy. I proceed first by describ• 
ing briefly the interwar economy, next by discussing the macro policies, 
and finally by raising some of the broader issues of the relationship 
*A substantial portion of this essay is based on a paper entitled 
"Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan", prepared for the sixth meet­
ing of the Conference on Modern Japan held at Fajardo, Puerto Rico, 
January 2•7, 1968. 1 am indebted to Yoshiko Kido for research 
assistance .. 
2. 
of economic policy to the course on which Japan found itself in the 
i930's. 
The literature on the Japanese economy refers to the 1920 1 s as 
a period of lagging or faltering growth. Relative to both the long­
run trend (since 1885) and to the World War I boom this certainly is 
correct, as demonstrated in Table l. 
Table 1: Growth Rate of Real Net Domestic Product 
per Decade (per cent) 
1880-1890 29.5 1910-1920 61.5 
1890-1900 67.6 1920-1930 33.4 
1900-1910 42.7 1930-1940 72.1 
Note on Table 1: Based on midpoint of five~year 
averages. 
Derived from Yujiro Hayami and Saburo Yamada, 
''Agricultural Productivity at the Beginning 
· of Industrialization", presented at Agricul­
t;ure and Economic Development: A Symposium 
on Japan's Experience, July 3-7, 1967, Appen­
qix C (Tentative Estimates of National Income 
and NDP at Market Prices). 
The facts 1 of growth o.f Net Domestic Product and of agriculture and 
manufacturing--the two major components for which relatively good 
data are available-.:suggest the following. First, the growth of 
NDP throughout the 1920's was indeed moderate but on the whole re­
spectable, at a peak-to-peak (1919-1928) annual rate of 3.2 p~r cent, 
and trough-to-trough (1920-1930) rate also of 3.2 per cent. During 
the 1930 1s, however, growth was considerably more rapid: 5.5 per 
cent annually between 1928-1938 (the rate between 1930-1938, 5.9 
per cent, is somewhat misleading since 1930 was at the bottom of re-
3. 
cession while 1938 represented continued high growth). 
Second, the increase in NDP during the 1920 1 s was entirely in 
manufacturing and services; as a trend value added in agriculture 
did not rise at all. Not only was the stagnation of agriculture the 
dominant contributor to the retardation of the overall growth rate, 
it had important implications for intersectoral relationships and for 
the growing agrarian distress. This very poor agrarian performance 
was true both of the 1920 1 s and the 1930 1s. 
Third, the year-to-year growth rate of NDP fluctuated consider­
ably. The absolute decline of 1920 was followed by a short-lived 
boom, the Tokyo-Yokohama earthquake of 1923 by another short-lived 
boom, while 1929-1930 saw another absolute decline (though the statis­
tics indicate a substantially less drastic decline than my conven­
tional impression). Thereafter, the growth rate was rapid, except 
for a brief slowdown in 1934. Frobably methods for estimating NDP 
(especially manufacturing value added) understate the actual degree 
of cyclical instability. For example, Professor Yasuba's index of 
industrial production, while not substantially different in results 
for the period 1919-1935. as a whole from that of Professor Shionoya, 
measures an absolute decline of 1.4 per cent in manufacturing ~slue 
added in 1930 and particularly 1931 (a further 5.5 per cent). More­
over, the NOP figures mask what happened in ~he major goods-producing 
sectors. Agricultural production fluctuated rather widely, and real 
value added in agriculture even more (reflecting changes in the real 
prices of output and of current inputsa-£6~tilizers; etc.). 
These aggregate results carry over directly into pet worker and 
per capita terms. NDP per worker increased by 93 per cent between 1919 
and 1938, and relative to total population by 78 per cent, with most of 
the growth occurring in the 1930 1 s. Agricultural output per worker 
increased very slowly, and then only really after 1934 (when some de­
cline in the agricultural labor force began). 
Average personal consumption per worker and per capita also rose 
moderately, though less rapidly than NDP since a higher proportion of 
output was devoted to government expenditures and private investment. 2 
Per capita average consumption grew only 5 per cent between 1922 and 
1928 peaks, but subsequently declined almost as much to the low in 
1932; the real increase came only thereafter. Moreover, this average 
level of living disguises what probably was an increasing inequality 
of living standards. The benefits of growth apparently accrued mainly 
to owners and employees of large-scale enterprise, skilled workers, 
government officials, l~ndlords, and professionals, while workers in 
small-scale manufacturing and service establishments and most farmer~ 
had no improvement, and even declines. For them productivity was vir­
tually constant, and real wages (deflated for changes in the cost of 
living), which remained high in the 1920 1s, declined in the Great De­
pression and were slow to rise.thereafter. It was this problem of 
income distribution, rather than substantial overall declines in out­
put, that would seem to account for the distress and tensions of the 
period. 
Why did this occur? One answer lies in the nature of economic 
performance in agriculture and manufacturing respectively. The strik­
ing change is the slowdown in agricultural output (in both total pro­
duction and value added). This is due almost entirely to a slowdown 
in the growth of total productivity, since there was only a small de­
crease in the rate of growth of total inputs (a weighted average of land, 
labor, capital, and current inputs such as seeds and fertilizers). 
Current inputs actually increased, and capital inputs grew at about 
the same rate as earlier (though notably not trees as the silk boom 
finally ground to a halt). The growth of arable land area slowed down 
considerably, and the agrarian labor force actually decreased some­
3what--but not in substantial numbers until the mid-193O 1 s. 
Why then did the rate of growth of ngricultural output per unit 
of land, and per worker, slow down so much? The issue is complex, 
and we do not have definitive answers. Clearly, agrarian price de­
clines and the deflationary policy were important factors. 4 
On net balance, price incentives for farmers to produce declined 
substantially between 1925 and the 1931 low for relevant price in­
dices.5 Prices farmers received dropped by 53.4- per cent; of course 
non-agricultural prices also decreased sharply (the manufacturers 
price index by 46.O per cent and wholesale price index by 42.7 per 
c~nt). The impact on farm real incomes was two-fold: in terms of the 
absolute decline, and relative to the decrease in prices of goods pur-
6. 
chased by farmers. 
The absolute decline in prices increased the burden of agricul­
tural debt in proportion. Farm debt, as surveyed in 1929, was high, 
at 4.59 billion·yen 86.6 per cent greater than value added in agricul­
ture that year~ Most (56.5 per cent) was owed to money_lenders and other 
6
individuals. Moreover, the price of land declined substantially, so 
that the value of debts relative to asset_s rose substantially. Rents, 
however, adjusted. In kind (koku of rice per~ of paddy) they actu­
ally decreased slightly, and in money terms (for upland fields) they 
dropped commensurately. Moneylenders, but not rentiers, benefitted 
from the deflation so long as their borrowers did not go bankrupt. 
To a considerable extent the adverse impact on farm real income 
of the absolute decline in prices received for agricultural goods sold 
was offset by the decrease in prices paid by farmers for goods they 
used in production and consumption. Prices for fertilizer and other 
current inputs actually decreased slightly more than prices of agri­
cultural output. However, the rural consumption price index did not 
decline as much (32.9 per cent). The terms of trade did turn somewhat 
against agriculture, however measured. 7 
This decline in farm prices occurred for a variety of reasons. 
One was the government policy to increase imports of cheap rice from 
Taiwan ~nd Korea; this bid the price down in Japan. Liu and Suits 
have estimated that "the inclusion of Korea and Formosa in the Japan­
ese rice market resulted in the suppression of rice price in Japan by 
18 per cent," and thot "a 1 per cent increase in the total rice im-
7. 
ports from the colonies would result in a 1.75 per cent reduction in 
the price of rice, 11 and hence that the incentives in the rice market 
operated so as to restrict rice output in Japan and encourage it in 
8the colonies. Second was the general deflationary policy of the gov­
ernment until 1931; probably prices were less elastic for agricultural 
than for manufactured goods. Third, the slide-off of world prices for 
agricultural goods beginning in the mid-1920 1 s, and particularly (for 
Japan) the decline in the price of raw silk, put downward pressure on 
Japanese agricultural prices. 
The decrease of silk prices by 32 per cent between 1925-1929, 
and another third by 1931 had a widespread agrarian impact, since two 
fann families out of five relied to some extent upon sericulture as a 
source of cash income. However, the average extent of this adversity 
may have been exaggerated. Sericulture at its maximum (in 1925 and 
again in 1929) constituted 19 per cent of total farm production at 
current prices; the minimum was 8 per cent in 1934 (when the price 
was unusually low). Suppose we take 1925 as the 11 right 11 base9 for 
the relative price of silk to all agricultural goods (and this is fa­
vorable to silk since its price was at a peak) and assume that the price 
of silk had declined no more than prices of all agricultural goods 
(excluding silk). The increase in the value of agricultural output 
in 1931 would have been about 90 million yen (in 1934-36 constant 
prices), or approximately 3 per cent, and in 1934 about 275 million 
yen (8 per cent). 10 
8. 
Presumably the decreases in prices reduced farmer incentives to 
produce. The labor inputs are measured in man-years, so we do not 
know whether or not farmers worked fewer man-hours per year. It ap­
pears that they did}l since the proportion of land double-cr0pped ac­
tually decreased slightly. 
Furthermore, the deflationary conditions in the 1920 1 s and early 
1930 1 s slowed the rate of growth in non-farm employment opportunities, 
especially in highly productive, large-scale manufacturing, as well as 
reducing the rate of growth of demand for agricultural products. 
The interwar performance of the manufacturing sector, in terms 
of output, was considerably better. Between 1919-1940, value added 
in manufacturing grew at_a 6.0 per cent average annual rate. Follow­
ing a slowdown in the early 1920 1 s, the growth rate accelerated from 
a beginning to end year average of 7.0 per cent for 1925-30, to 8.2 
per cent for 1930-35, and 11.0 per cent for 1935-40. While the cotton 
textile industry came into full bloom, emanating from the World War I 
boom, there was continued diversification of production, particularly 
in iron and steel, chemicals and machinery. Large firms probably grew 
in relative importance. Nonetheless, as late as 1929, for gross out­
put in factories of five or more employees as recorded in the census of 
manufactures, slightly less than one-third was produced by firms of 
500 or more employees, and about 40 per cent came from firms of 5-99 
employees. Firms with four or fewer employees produced from a fourth 
to a fifth of total manufacturing output. 
9. 
As an absorber of labor, the manufacturing sector's performance 
was less good. The population censuses of 1920, 1930, and 1940 pro­
vide us the most complete information on the ways in which the econom­
ically active population (labor force) was used. Manufacturing absorbed 
only 11 per cent of the increase in labor force in the 1920 1 s, but 74 
per cent in the 1930 1s. 12 The 1920 1 s and early 1930 1 s was a period 
of workers looking anywhere for jobs; not until the mid-1930 1 s did 
productive jobs become available. The result was a large swelling of 
the labor force in low-productivity service activities, notably retail 
trade and personal services, with correspondingly low incomes. Indus­
trialization and population growth resulted in "surplus labor" spil­
ling over from agriculture into the cities. 
Even those absorbed into manufacturing between 1920 and 1930 were 
13hired mainly by small, low-productivity establishments. Bmployment 
in firms of 500 or more workers decreased by 90,000 (15.8 per cent 
from the 1920 base) over the decade, a decline from 1927 more than 
offsetting earlier increases. Not until 1933 did employment in such 
large firms begin to grow significantly. Corresponding to this dis­
tribution of labor was a large and widening difference in output per 
worker and wages per worker relative to firm size. 14 Overall, output 
per worker in manufacturing rose absolutely and relative to agricul­
ture. However, the productivity and wages of small manufacturing £inns 
were probably faily closely related to those in agriculture. The large 
firms were able to increase capital per worker substantially and to 
10. 
take advantage of the most ~odern technology, thereby enharteing out­
put per worker. This gave them the ability to pay l:iigher wages, which 
they did r6r reasorts Which are not entirely alear. Partial explana­
tions include: large firms probably used more skilled labor; they 
wanted to reduce labor turnover, they used relatively more males than 
females, they set higher educational standards for hiring employees, 
they wanted first pick of employees. The interwar period was char­
acterized by what Ohkawa and Rosovsky have tenned the "differential 
structure"--a widening productivity and wage gap between the modern 
sector comprising large-scale industrial enterprises (using modern 
technology and relatively large amounts of capital per worker) and the 
traditional sector of small-scale, labor-intensive units of production 
using traditional, or less modern, techniques of production--typified 
by agriculture, many small manufacturing enterprises, and certain com­
ponents of the service sectors. 15 
During the World War I boom, money wages in manufacturing and 
agriculture rose rapidly, but the cost of living went up at an equal 
rate, so that real wages remained constant. In 1919, and again in 
1921 when the cost of living increase had halted, money and real wages 
increased sharply for both skilled and unskilled labor. The remainder 
of the 1920 1 s and the early 1930 1 s was one of erratic h~t persistent 
and heightening deflation. The cost of living decreased at first 
slightly and then, between 1928 and 1932, sharply. Money wages also 
declined slightly during the 1920 1s, so that real wages were relatively 
11. 
constant until 1930, and at conaiderably higher levels than those prior 
to 1919. 
With the onslaught of the Great Depression, the pattern of money 
16and real wages diverged for skilled and for unskilled labor. For 
unskilled labor (typified by female workers in agriculture and in tex­
tiles--whose relative wage rates remained very stable--and by male 
workers in agriculture) money wages were reduced even more than the 
sharp decline in prices, so that real wages dropped by 20 per cent or 
more before beginning to rise again in the mid-1930 1s. For skilled 
labor (typified by male workers in iron and steel and in machinery), 
money wages declined only slightly; real wages actually increased be­
tween 1929 and 1933. Hence, skilled worker wages rose relative to 
unskilled. This, together with the real wage patterns during the 19-
201s, suggests the existence of two distinct labor markets in int~r­
war Japan: skilled and unskilled. The supply of skilled workers was 
not highly elastic nor increasing more rapidly than increases in de­
mand. Demand for skilled workers grew due to: the overall growth of 
industry; the changing industrial composition, particularly the rise 
of such industries as machinery, iron and steel, and chemicals, which 
required a higher proportion of skilled workers; and a rising capital/ 
labor ratio embodying more skill-using technologies within industries. 
In contrast, the supply of unskilled workers was highly elastic; in­
deed there was an overflow into services. Yet demand for unskilled 
workers increased only slowly. 
12. 
How do we explain these wage-employment-output relationships1 
The World War I boom culminated in a temporary labor shortage, even 
for unskilled labor. As indicated above, the continuing real wage 
increases for skilled workers is consonant with demand-supply relation­
ships for their services. For unskilled workers the answers are less 
clear. During the 1920's they were not being absorbed into manufactur­
ing in sufficient quantities relative to supply to suggest continuing 
shortage. 
It appears that an important component of the explanation lies in 
the downward stickiness of money wages. For unskilled workers there 
was SJme actual decline during the 1920 1s in money wage rates but it 
was resisted, as the rising number of labor disputes, and their causes, 
testify. Not until the 1930-32 depression were finns able to push un­
skilled worker money wages down substantially. 17 The downward sticki­
ness of money wage rates appears to be a common characteristic of in­
dustrial countries, rather than anything which was specific to Japan. 
Indeed, in the face of real adversity, the Japanese wage and price 
structure was considerably more flexible than those in the United King­
dom, Germany,, or the United States. 18 
My interpretation is that all this was produced by a combination 
of World War I boom-induced disequilibria, business subsequent defla­
tionary expectations about price movements, and a downward stickiness 
of money wages. The World War I boom was tremendous; it engendered 
the most rapid industrial and overall growth Japan had ever had, and 
13. 
in the process had resulted in a shortage of industrial labor, high 
prices (a doubling of the price level)and high money wages. It is 
likely that temporarily the price of labor relative to capital was 
higher than relative stockr:1 of lnbor and cap~· '.:al would d:'.ctate in 
equilibrium. If these relative prices tended to continue, it would 
pay firms to substitute capital for labor. Businessmen realized that 
their prices for goods were high and that the pressures of foreign 
competition were likely to push prices down. They could anticipate 
deflationary fiscal and monetary policies. This made it imperative 
that ways be found to reduce costs of production. Moreover; they 
probably felt that it -s-ruld be difficult to push money wages down much, 
whereas they could (correctly) expect some decrease in the price of 
investment goods, especially imported (or import-competi':ive) machin­
ery. Firms hence felt it economical to obtain a more stable labor 
force, to train it more as skill requirements increased, and to use 
more capital-intensive techniques of production. 
Institutional factors were not unimportant. It was known that 
legislation restricting night shift work by women and children would 
go into effect in the late 1920 1 s. This struck particularly hard at 
the textile industry, which alone accounted for more than half of fac­
tory employment. Firms respond(.' by "rationalization"; for example, 
in cotton spinning the number of operative spindles per worker in­
creased from 23 in 1922 (not much differ~:.... !: from prewar) to 42 in 1930 
and 53 in 1935. 
14. 
The substitution of capital for labor was probably reinforced 
by an imperfect capital market in which large firms, and firms affili­
ated with large banks, obtained access to funds to finance investment 
and at relatively low cost, whereas smaller firms had difficulty bor­
rowing and issuing bonds and had to do so at higher cost. Moreover, 
this gap probably also existed in the ability to borrow and absorb 
foreign technology. All of this is tied in with economies of scale. 
To the extent that the differential structure results from skill dif­
ferentials and market imperfections, it is probably a characteristic 
common to all industrializing countries. 
In the previous section a continuing motif is the impact of de­
flationary pressures culminating in 1931: on agriculturnl productiv­
ity; on the capital/labor ratio in manufacturing (especially in large 
firms); hence on output per worker in manufacturing and on the (in) 
ability of the manufacturing sector to absorb the growing labor force; 
on the persistent high level of real wages due to downward stickiness 
of money wages; and consequently upon the distribution of income. The 
deflationary pressures were essentially a government policy response 
to the difficulties, emanating out of World War I, in restoring to 
equilibrium the relationship between Japan's domestic economy and its 
19
economic activity with the rest of the world. The basic problem was 
that prices in Japan had risen more than they had abroad; once the war 
ended, Japan was not able to compete sufficiently in international mar­
kets despite the war-induced growth and diversification of industry. 
15. 
These difficulties manifested themselves in both Japan
1 s balance of 
payments -and in:the exchange rate between yen and foreign currencies. 
Restoration of international equilibrium was the most important eco­
nomic issue of the 1920 1s. The government saw the essence of the issue 
as: when, and under what conditions, should Japan return to the gold 
standard? 
The emphasis upon the return to t.he gold standnrd was not some­
thing uniquely Japanese. Irtdeed, it undet:lay the polic:Y: objectives 
of all the major industrial countries.~
0 The restoration of a nation's 
currency to convertibility and with a stable international value was 
generally regarded as fundamental to an international system of multi-
lateral, relatively free trade. Only by this means could European 
recovery be achieved and international prosperity assured. Quite na­
turally, given the experience prior to World War I, countries conceived 
of such a fixed exchange standard: convertibility of one's currency 
was to gold, rather than simply to another country's currency. Through­
out the 1920 1.s the major nations struggled to return to gold, but on 
a piecemeal basis without much coordination. Some--the United King-
dom was archetypical--returned at a seriously overvalued exchange rate; 
others--notably France--at a seriously undervalued exchange rate. 
For Japan World War I was a great boon--an external, exogenous 
demand stimulus for Japanese exports and depressant of imports which 
had out-competed domestic producers. The result was a surge of domes­
tic growth, inflation, and a large current account surplus in the bal-
16. 
ance of payments which by 1919 had resulted in a cumulation of foreign 
assets in excess of the heavy indebtedness position of 1913. Most of 
the war-related increase in foreign assets was held by the government 
and the central bank (the Bank of Japan)~ Accordingly the money supply 
had virtually tripled, enabling prices to rise sharply despite goveth.-·· 
ment budget surpluses between 1914 artd 1919. We do hot have solid data 
for all types of capital flows; the informE\tion on non.i.gc:·rvernmental 
short-term capital flows is particulariy weak. Nonetheless, the rough 
estimates of Table 2 provide adequate indication of the major., shifts· 
in the total long-term indebtedness, in foreign exchange reserves, and 
in certain of the specific items. Japan used its current account sur­
plus (re Table 3 21 )to increase its own loans and investments in China, 
to help Britain, France, and Russia22 , and to build up its foreign ex­
change reserves while not paying off its own foreign borrowings in ad­
vance to an¥ substantial extent. 
Japan ended the war in the strongest foreign exchange reserve po­
sition in its history. Reserves were equivalent to about 10 months 1 · 
imports. Most were held abroad, 23 but Japan had also imported substan­
tial gold for reserve purposes until September 1917, when the United 
States embargoed gold exports (England had gone off the gold standard 
earlier). Japan thereupon also went off the gold standard, which me!Ult 
that the government and Bank of Japan refused to sell gold or allow it 
to leave the country. However, the government and Bank of Japan bought 
up the foreign exchange balances accruing to Japanese banks financing 
17. 
Table 2 
Japanese Balance of International Indebtedness 
Exclusive of Short-Term Capital 
(rough estimates in million yen) 
1913 1919 1929 
Japanese Long-Term Liabilities 2,070 1,822 2,5l~9 
Borrowing from Abroad 1,970 1,722 2,304 
Foreign Direct Investment in Japan 100 100 245 
Japanese Long-Term Assets 529 1,850 1,676 
Loans to Abroad 61 975 245 
China 55 417 244a 
Allies 557 a 
Japanese Direct Investment 468 875 1,431 
China 278 (600) (750)
South Manchuria Railway 100 100 391 
Net Long-Term Position -1,Sl~l 28 -873 
Foreign Exchange Reserves 376 2, ot.,5 1,343 
Net Position Excluding Short-Term 
Balances -1, 165 2,073 470 
~xcluded are defaulted loans of 27 million yen to the Chinese govern­
ment and 2M million yen to czarist Russia. The direct investment 
estimates are crude, particularly Japanese investment in China, 
which for 1919 and 1929 are no more than orders of magnitude. For 
China the distinction between loans and direct investment is some­
what arbitrary. 
Source: Derived from Harold G. Houlton, Japan, An Economic and 
Financial Appraisal (Washington: Brookings Institution, 
1931), pp. 390-l~03; Bank of Japan, Hundred-Year Statistics 







1Summary Balance of Payments of the Japanese Empire 
Balance on Current 
Accounta 
1. Trade Balance 
2. Invisible 
Balance 
Changes in Foreign 
Exchange 
3. Gold Flows 










(in million yen) 
1908- 1914- 1920-
1913 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1923 
-lll,2. 4 3035 .o - 79.3 -246.2 -181.5 -447.9 - 954. 9 
- 706.5 1197.5 -500 .1 -l,l,2. 0 -336.1 -617.7 -1895. 9 
- l,35. 9 1837.5 420.8 il.95.8 154.6 169.8 941.0 
167.7 1700.7 126.7 - 74.7 -233.5 -171.1 - 357 .6 
- 59. 7 603,8 407.5 132.5 1.1 - 0.1 5ia.o 
227.4 1096.9 -280.8 -207. 2 -239.6 -171,0 - 898,6 
-1310.1 1334.3 li-7,l, -171.5 5 7 .0 -276.8 - 597. 3 
Japan Proper, Taiwan, Korea, South Sea Mandated Islands. 
aMinus indicates net inflow. 
bMinus indicates net decrease of reserves and outflow of gold. 
cMinus indicates net inflow of capital, 
d
Where information not available, assumed to be fully in (short-term) capital 
account. 
19. 
Table 3 (continued) 
1924-
192l} 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1929-·- -
I. Balance on Current
Accounta -565. 6 -202.1 -302. 5 -141.1 -172.7 19.0 -1365 .o 
1. Trade Balance -729.8 -357.0 -442.5 -209.0 -333.9 -168.3 -2320,5 
2. Invisible
Balance 164.2 154. 9 140.0 ll,.7. 9 161. 2 187.3 955 .s 
II. Changes in Foreign
Exchange Reservesb -118.5 - 90 .o - 59.8 - 80.0 - 71. 6 14lt.O - 276.7 
3. Gold Flows 0 - 22.0 - 31.8 - 36.0 0.4 0.5 - 88.8 
l} • Balances Held
.II.broad -118.5 - 68.0 - 28.0 - 44.0 - 72.0 143.5 - 187. 9 
III. Other Capital
Flowsc -447.1 -112.1 -2l}2. 7 - 2, lt - 44.6 - 86.5 -1088. 3 
5. Long-Term -238.0 - 63.9 - 36.9 +126.2 - 53.l:- 52.8 - 213.2 
6. Short-Term -209.1 - 48,2 -205.8 -128.6 8.8 -139.3 - 875 .1 
IV. Errors andd
Ommissions - 58. 7 - 56.5 - 38.5 
20. 
Table 3 (continued) 
1930-
1930 1931 1931 :1932 1933 1934 
I. Balance on Current 
Accounta - 27.3 - 5 7 .5 - 84.8 43.3 31. 9 62.9 
1. Trade Balance -160. 3 -ll,1.1 -301. lf - 58.8 - 77. 9 -129.3 
2. Invisible 
Balance 133.0 83.6 216.6 102.1 109.8 192.2 
II. Changes in Foreign 
Exchange Reservesb -383.0 -li03,0 -786.0 - 3.0 - 59.0 0 
3. Gold Flows -286,8 -388. 2 -675.0 -112 .1 - 20. 9 0 
lf. Balances Held 
..i\broad - 96. 2 - 14.8 -111.0 109.1 - 38.1 0 
III. Other Capital 
. C
Flows 319.7 328.7 720. l, 127.8 152,5 - 2.9 
5, Long-Term 92,0 233.9 325. 9 167.8 41.0 233.2 
6, Short-Term 227.7 94.8 494.5 - 40.0 111.5 -226.1 
IV. Errors andd 
Ommissions - 36.0 16.8 - 19.2 -174.1 -179.6 - 65. 8 
21· 
Table 3 (continued) 
1932-
1935 1936 1937 1937 
I. Balance on Current 
Accounta 310.1 131.0 - 653.0 73.8 
1. Trade Balance 131.8 -101.9 - 635 .o - 871.1 
2. Invisible 
Balance 178.3 232.9 18.0 797.3 
II. Changes in Foreign 
E~::change Reservesb 36.0 l~6 .0 -1220.1 -1200.1 
3. Gold Flows 0.1 0 - 866.9 - 999,8 
l}. Balances Held 
Abroad 35. 9 l}6. 0 - 353. 2 - 200.3 
III. Other Capital 
Flowsc 245. 8 130. 7 567.1 1221.0 
5. Long-Term 454.6 226.6 567.1 1123. 2 
6. Short-Term -208.8 95. 9- 97.8 
IV. Errors andd 
Ornmissions 28.3 - 45. 7 
Note: 1937 capital and foreign exchange data are not fully compar­
able Hith previous years; "balances held abroad II might 
equally well be classified under short-term capital flows. 
Source: E. B. Schumpeter, ed. The Industrialization of Japan and 
Manchukuo 1930-1940, Appendix Table III; Ninistry of 
Finance, Zaisei Kinyu Tokei Geppo, No. 5 (May 1950). 
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exports, in effect pegging the exchange rate at close to the gold stan-
24
dard par (100 yen equal to $49.85). 
What did Japan need tQ return to the golf standard at a partic­
ular par rate? The most important requisite was sufficiently competi­
tive export strength, in terms of domestic prices converted into inter­
national prices at the target exchange rate, to be able to pay for im­
ports (given capital flows) commensurate with a desired or expected 
rate of growth of GNP. Moreover, Japan needed sufficient foreign ex­
change reserves to be nble to combat any immediate or eventual tempor­
ary situation of excess demand for foreign exchange over supply. Re­
lated to this, the government had to inspire confidence that the ex­
change rate and the timing were correct in order not to provoke adverse 
speculation. An additional concern was to have adequate gold backing, 
held in Japan, for the Bank of Japan paper currency in circulation. 25 
The Japanese government was astounded at the bold United States 
move to return (in June 1919) to the gold standard, (at the prewar 
par) rather soon after the war ended. It moved much more cautiously, 
and for good reasons. 
The immediate reason was the speculative bubble of late 1919 and 
early 1920 which burst in March 1920. Businessmen had expected prices 
of goods to continue to rise; since anything could be sold at a pro­
fit it was delivery, not price, that became important. This spread 
from the commodities market into the stock market, where a speculative 
mania erupted. It also spilled over into foreign trade, with a big 
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upsurge of ';nports leading to a current account deficit. This in turn 
produced an automatic contraction of the domestic money supply. The 
bubble burst from the combined impact of cheap imports and tighter 
money. The downturn was sharp. Wholesale prices, which had gone from 
200.3 (1913 = 100) in May 1919 to 321.5 by March 1920, declined pre~ 
cipitousJ.y to 247.7 by June, and continued to slide off to a low 189.8 
in April 1921 when the government's counter-recession policies took 
hold. For there was indeed a recession, in Japan and worldwide-·~the 
downturn in England and the United States did not begin until summer 
1920 &nd continued longer than in Japan. 
Another immediate, and pervasive, reason was highly political. 
Although government bureaucrats in 1919 favored an early return to the 
gold standard, Finance Minister Korekiyo Takahashi rejected it on the 
grounds that it would probably result in a gold outflow from Japan 
~nd Japan needed the gold for expansion into China. China needed 
investment in railroads and industry. If Japan did not lend China the 
funds, England and the United States would. Whoever did so would be 
able to dominate China. Inouye, then president of the Bank of Japan, 
263upported Takahashi's position. 
The government was too caught up in its immediate problems, and 
the uncertainties which they engendered, to move tow,'.lrd quick re-e.s­
tgblishment of the gold standard at the prewar par. The underlying 
problem was more serious: during World War I Japan's prices had ri.sen 
more than, and in the 1920-21 recession did not decline nearly as much 
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as, its competitors in world markets (see Table 4). At the prewar par 
exchange rate, at about which the actual rate continued due to govern­
ment pegging, Japanese exports were too expensive and foreign imports 
too cheap. The consequence was inevitable: the currect acccount of 
the balance of payments moved from surplus to deficit. 
What policy alternatives were available to Japan to restore equi­
librium in its balance of payments? The fundamental problem under such 
circumstances is to obtain and maintain a balance between docestic and 
world price levels. One method is to let domestic prices go their own 
way (to achieve domestic goals) and to achieve international equilibri­
um by a fluctuating exchange rate. Aside from some adverse effects on 
foreign traders by increasing uncertainty, this approach was the anti­
thesis of the objective to return to the gold standard (fixed exchange 
rate) system. Under such a system the only way to adjust to world pri­
ces is to change the domestic price level. Here there were two choices: 
to return at the prewar gold value of yen, or to establish a new value. 
For Japan, the fonner meant a deflationary policy sufficient to get 
domestic prices in line with (declining) world prices, the latter meant 
devaluation--setting a new parity, less yen to the dollar and pound-­
such that domestic deflation would not be necessary. 27 
But devaluation was not considered a really suitable alternative 
for major, advanced countries--in the 1920 1 s even more than today. A 
country had to bear its burden, swallow its medicine, and do the right 
thing. After all, look how England fought stubbornly and valiantly to 
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get back to the gold standard at the ordained par--even if domestic 
deflation did mean 10 per cent unemployment and it did take until 1925. 
Apparently devaluation--returning to the gold standard at a new, low­
er par--was never con&idered seriously by Japanese policymakers in the 
1920 1s. The only choice was to push prices down at home. (We must 
remember that in the 1920 1 s it was not well understood that an impor­
tant part of this adjustment process was not just prices but the slow­
ing of economic growth.) 
There were other ways in which Japan could at least mitigate the 
fundamental disequilibrium in its balance of payments. One was to 
restrict import demand by raising tariffs. 28 Another was to return 
to a pattern of net foreign borrowing, which after all had successfully 
shored up the gold standard before World War I. In the first instance 
this would simply involve the drawing of accumulated foreign exchange­
reserves, but eventually would necessitate substantial long-term bor­
rowing. Given its income level and growth potential, there is no 
reason why Japan should not have been a net borrower. 
During the 1920's Japan tried all these methods, in concert and 
sequentially: exchange rate fluctuation and thereby depreciation, 
deflation, increases in tariffs, using up of foreign exchange reserves 
and renewed foreign borrowing, and finally, return to the gold stan­
dard at the prewar par. But no policies were pushed long and hard 
enough until 1929--they were palliatives reflecting a fundamental in­
decisiveness at the highest policy level. I believe this was a basic 
j 
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in th~ : Terms Average Foreign
United United Exchange · of Exchange Rate' 
· Year Kingdom· States Japan Ratea 'rrade · 1oo·yeill yen/shilling 
(Japan)· 
1913 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 49.375 2t-1/2
.:.··>:?,.: 1914 100.0 ·: · 94.397.9 95.5 95.3 49.500 2/-1/4,.,.. : •··i .. 
·. 1915 127.0 100.0 96.6 95.6 
:.•, 90. 5 . 48.875. ., 2/-9/16
1916 160.0 122.9 116.8 118.3 98.5 50.000 2/10 1/4
1917 ·. 206.0 167.2 . 147.0 1.50,3 94.5 50.500 2/10 9/16 
·. 1918 226.0 /187 .9 192,5 '2'00,3 82.3 51.375 2/10 15/16
1919 242.0 198.9 235,9. 241_.9 99,9 50.625 2/3-
1920 307.0 220.8 259.3- · · 260.6 98,1 49.625 2/7 1/2
1921. 197.0 139.9 200.3 194.7 142.0 48.ooo 2/5 7/8
'1922 159,0 138,9 195.8 189.9 134.2 47.875 2/1 3/4
'·. 1923 · 159.0 143,9 . 199,2 197.2 : 136.6 48.875 2/1 9/16
1924 166.0 140.8 206.5 175. 7 .117.7 42.000. 1/10 13/16 
•, •'
1925 159,0. 147.9 201.7 166.5 108.2 40.750 1/8 1/4
1926 147.9 142.9 .. 178.7 169.7 ; 109. 3 46.875 1/11 1/8
1927 141.9 137. o, 169.8 162.9 117,5 47.375 1/11 7/16 · 
1928 140.0 139,9 170.9 ·' 160.9 105.5 46.500 1/10 7/8
1929 137.0 137.9 166.1 155,0 106.6 46.070 1/10.755 
·1930 119.9 125.1 136,7 136,7 98.6 
r ·-
49.367 2/0.3112
1931 105.2 105.7 115,6 114.4 100.6 48.871 2/1.947 
. 1932 102.6 93.8 128.2 73,0 84.6 28.120 1/7.157 
1 . 1933. 102.7 . 95.4 147.0 . 75.1 . 77 .6 g5.227 1/2.409 .·l;_ /-if .1934 . 105.6 · 108.4 149.8 89,5· 67.4 29.511 1/2.069 
j . · ··-;,., .· · 1935 106.7 115.7 ·.' 153·, 7 88.9 ,. 62.7 28.570 1/2-,>j \:·It. :'. :'1936 113.3 117.0 160.1 93.9 65.6 28.951 1/2-
~ .;'--' .,,.• '.··, 1937 130.4 . · 194. 4150,5 113.4 64.1 28.813 1/2-
. : 121.6 13·(. O . 205. O 118.3 68.4 28.496 1/2-1;·ttlt(mi 123.3 111.6 226.6 119.3 81.9 25.984 1/2.054 
-~: l • . °wholesale ·price index multiplied.by average· exchange rate in dollars,,.,._••,i ' 
·....;. ' 
Bank of Jap~n, Hundred-Year Statistics; Ohkawa et al., Pricesi.Vol. 8, 
LTES. ~; ·: ;' , i 
'·,;. 
: . : \';- .' 
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cause of the malaise of the 1920 1 s. Before turning to a discussion 
of the deflationary approach, I trace briefly the use of other policy 
measures. 
Japan had sharply depreciating and then again rising exchange rate 
between March 1924 and mid-1926 not because of a deliberate government 
policy but because the government could no longer maintain the pegged 
rate neav parity. The basic reason was a persistent current account 
deficit which ate up foreign exchange reserves; the pegged rate simply 
could not be maintained indefinitely. There was also a highly impor­
tant immediate cause: the Tokyo-Yokohama earthquake of September 1, 
1923. The destruction was great; quick reconstruction required a large 
amount of imports over and above regular needs. Exports were needed 
at home; moreover, substantial productive capacity had been destroyed 
or rendered inoperative. The trade deficit worsened sharply. Successive 
governments insisted that the exchange would remain pegged, but it 
began to slip in New York. A divergence between New York and Tokyo 
rates could not be maintained; finally on March 18, 1924 the govern-
ment had to abandon pegging and allow the rate to find a market-deter­
mined level. The rate dropped sharply, to a low $38.50 per 100 yen 
by year-end, a decline of 22 per cent. The trade balance responded 
favorably; the demand for imports slowed down and exports increased. 
The improvement in the trade balance, an increased receptivity 
in foreign capital markets to Japanese borrowing, and a policy decision 
to ship government gold out all tended to raise the exchange rate in 
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1925. To this was added a speculative element. Those who had previous­
ly speculated against the yen now speculated in its favor because of 
the more favorable underlying factors plus renewed expectation that the 
29government would support the parity rate. Thereafter the foreign ex-
change rate meandered between $44-49, rising fairly sharply from this 
lower level in the second half of 1929 when Japan had finally determined 
to return to the gold standard at prewar parity. 
Tariff policy was also used to restrict imports, but for protection~ 
ist as much as balance of payments reasons. Certain World War I growth 
industries, such as chemicals and iron and steel, which were not yet 
fully competitive against imports, obtained increased tariff protection 
in 1920. The Great Earthquake quite naturally was an occasion for the 
imposition of 100 per cent ad valorem duties on some 120 luxury items 
(primarily manufactured consumer goods). In 1926 there was a complete 
revision of tariffs, thereby embodying and formalizing principles which 
were already in operation. Industrial raw materials were duty free; 
this increased the effective tariff protection of manufactured goods 
and made their export more competitive. Some important infant industries-­
iron and steel, sugar, copper, dyestuffs, woolen textiles--were protec­
ted, though engineering was not particularly. High duties continued on 
the luxuries. 30 
In addition to the apparently rather large amount of short-term 
capital, speculative in part at least, which flowed into Japan between 
1920-1929, Japan wae a net gorrower on long-term. The national govern-
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ment was only a sporadic borrower: 229 million yen (e25 million 6 per 
cent 35-year bonds issued at 87~, $150 million 6~ per cent 40-year bonds 
issued at 92~) in February 1924 to redeem sterling loans falling due 
and for earthquake reconstruction; and 102.5 million yen (bl2.5 million 
5~ per cent 35-year bonds issued at 90 and $71 million 5~ per cent 35-
year bonds issued at 90) in May 1930 to redeem sterling bonds falling 
due between July 1930-January 1931. In addition, government outstand­
ing domestic bonds were purchased by foreigners, especially when the 
exchange rate was low. Municipalities sold some bonds abroad, but the 
main long-term issues abroad were of industrial debentures, notably by 
Japanese electric power firms. 
The balance of payments data in Table 3 are net estimates, while 
Japan's gross foreign capital needs were somewhat larger, in order to 
finance Japanese lending and investment abroad. From the rough esti­
mates of Table 2, it appears that Japan's long-term assets increased 
only moderately between 1919 and 1929, from 1,850 million yen to 2,187 
million yen (including 511 million yen in bad debts). 
Overall Japan was not able, or did not try hard enough, to borrow 
sufficient long-term capital to finance more than a small fraction31 
of its current account deficit. The immediate alternative was to use 
up foreign exchange reserves. The longer-run solution lay only in re­
storation of export competitiveness by domestic deflation. 
The indecisiveness in deflationary policy during the decade of the 
1920 1 s was, to my mind, a fatal weaknes£. If it had to be done at all--
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and clearly a preferable policy would have been to de-value and there­
by return to the gold standard at a lower par soon after World War I 
(say in 1921 or 1922), or certainly after the excuse provided by the 
Great Earthquake--deflation should have been more swift and severe. 
The 20 per cent decline in 1921 from the 1S20 average wholesale price 
level was not enough; perhaps as much as another 20 per cent would have 
been required. Such a policy would have ruined many more firms, caused 
the collapse of many more banks, and probably led to really severe dis­
ruption of the economy, but at least it would have cleared the slate 
for a renewed emphasis on growth. On the other hand, erratic doses 
of deflation, countered by renewed counter-deflationary expansion of 
demand through fiscal and especially monetary policy, was essentially 
debilitating. The problem with the former, more drastic approach is 
like that of major surgery: the operation may be a success bu: the 
patient may die, 
Why didn't the government ever really push through a fully effec­
tive deflationary policy until 1929? The main reason seems to lie in 
a series of minor economic crises emanating from a variety of exoge­
nous and endogenous sources: the Great Earthquake, shifts in foreign 
demand due to the world business cycle, the domestic speculative mania 
of 1919-1920, the banking syste~ crisis of 1927, the deflationary pol­
icy itself. In all these instances difficulties were exacerbated by 
the inherent weakness of the domestic financial system. In order to 
prevent the system from collapsing, at the first (or eventual) signs 
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of trouble the Bank of Japan had to rush in and pump· in liquidity. 
This inevitably undercut the deflationary policy. 
Why, and in what ways, did the difficulties in the economy show 
up in the financial sector? First, the financial system in most market 
economies is the usual intermediary of a tight or easy monetary policy, 
spreading its effects to producers and distributors by shifts in its 
willingness and ability to lend. On the whole, the evolving Japanese 
banking system had demonstrated its ability to assist in the financing 
of economic growth when things were going well--when funds were avail­
able and business wanted to borrow for investment purposes. Indeed 
the development of the banking system prior to
32 
and during World War 
I had been highly responsive to the types of financing needed for growth, 
rather than adopting the inhibiting rules of, say, British commercial 
banking. 
However, Japan's banking system was not well constructed to with­
stand the pressures of recessions, of deflation, or of sporadic ran­
dom shocks. The deficiencies of the system can be summed up in three 
interrelated characteristics: there were a large number of small, 
unit banks; many banks tended to concentrate risk of default by lend­
ers, rather than diversifying it, by making large loans (relative to 
net worth) to a few borrowers; and depositors had no guaranteed means 
of protection. 
While the number of ordinary (commercial) banks had declined from 
the peak of l81H in 1901, many remained at the end of World War I (see 
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Table 5). Although there were a number of banks of intermediate size, 
in essence there were two groups: a small number (epitomized by the 
"Big Five") of very large banks located in the major cities, notably 
Tokyo and Osaka; and a large number of quite small banks located in 
smaller towns as well as the larger cities. The government, in princi­
ple, did not allow new banks to be established during the interwar 
period. It encouraged the reduction in total number by merger among 
small, weak banks in the same locality. Mergers often did not help 
much, being only an amalgamation of dubious assets, The decline in 
total bank net worth attests to the necessary writing down of reserves 
and capital upon merger, The occasional crises forced many small banks 
to fail; they usually would be absorbed by larger banks. In this way 
there was some increase in the number of branch offices of the large 
city banks, though still moderate until the 1930 1 s. The amalgamation 
of banks from 1925 on led to a reduction in the total number of bank 
offices, The apparent decline in service to the population was compen­
sated, in part at least, by the increasing urbanization .. 
Many of the banks--both large and small--were owned and controlled 
by stockholders who also had industrial interests. These banks, and 
others as well, tended to lend a high proportion of their funds to these 
related business interests--to help their growth in good times and pre­
vent, if necessary, their bankruptcy in bad times. There were no re­
strictions on the maximum size of a loan in relation to a bank's worth, 
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Note: The large increase in ordinary banks in 1922 was due to changes in the 
Savings Bank Law whereby many institutions found it desirable to alter 
their status, 
Sources: Bank of. Japan, Hundred-Year Statistics; .Ohkawa et al.~ The Growth Rate 
of the Japanese Economy. 




panic of 1927. Many banks had aggressive growth aims. Not only did they, 
expand loans to affiliated borrowers, they would borrow funds in the 
call market to do so. This made them even more vulnerable to adversity, 
since other financial institutions making call loans might well refuse 
to continue their loans to the bank. 
Depositors were attracted to a bank by its conveeience of location, 
deposit interest rate, and degree of safety. The larger banks did not 
have many offices, so it often was not convenient to deposit with them. 
A wise man would withdraw his deposit in currency if he thought his 
bank might somehow be in, or on the verge of, trouble. There was no 
deposit insurance against default by the bank due to its inability to 
cash in deposits for currency. 
The system was made for panic-stricken bank runs. An individual 
bank was heavily loaned up, holding small reserves. It was subject 
to insolvency (having to close its doors--refusing to provide currency 
for deposits) either because of a depositor run or difficulties of one 
of its major borrowers. A major borrower could either be in temporary 
straits (fundamentally sound but in a liquidity crisis because, for ex­
ample, a buyer might delay in paying his bill) or bankrupt (assets less 
than liabilities). The bank would have to lend to this borrower or 
else face the likelihood of its loan being defaulted. News of the 
business's difficulty might get out; people, knowing of its close re­
lationship with the bank, would fear for the safety of their deposits 
and hurry to withdraw them. Or the bank and its borrowers might be in 
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perfectly sound condition, but a run might have started on another small 
I 
bank in town and depositors, becoming generally apprehensive, would de­
cide to withdraw. 
These shifts in liquidity preference happen rapidly, and spread 
rapidly and cumulatively, in the manner of a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
No single bank can afford to hold currency in its vaults sufficient to 
meet a sudden, large-scale demand to pay off its depositors. It must 
receive currency from other banks--larger banks with which it has a 
correspondent or other relationship, ultimately from the Bank of Japan 
as central bank. 
Several problems exist. One is simply the technical difficulty 
of timing: in having delivery of currency made before the bank subject 
to the run runs out. The bank might close its doors for a few hours or 
days, but at the price of reducing its future creditability. The more 
serious problem is to obtain the loan of currency. The financial in­
stitution lending to it wants sound collateral, not the bad or risky 
debts of affiliated, small enterprises. Moreover, the large banks were 
perhaps not so sorry to see runs occur, so long as the runs were of 
minor proportions and did not affect them. After all, depositors at the 
small banks under pressure didn't simply hold the cash they had with­
drawn; they deposited in the large bank. Moreover, the small banks would 
be forced into amalgamation with the large banks on terms favorable to 
the latter. 
The system hence was intrinsically subject to failures of individual 
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banks and to cepositor runs on the banks. Public loss of confidence 
in banks disrupts the economy, making it difficult to finance economic 
activity. The B,mk of Japan and government were well aware of this. 
Whenever a panic got underway, they stepped in quickly to avert its 
spread. 
The monetary authorities were impaled upon the horns of dilem­a 
ma. The basic policy was to restrict central bank credit and money 
supply enough to reduce prices sufficiently to restore balance of pay­
ments equilibrium. But equally basic was a determination to prevent 
widespread financial panics. The relief measures inevitably involved 
central bank loans, by direct or indirect routes, to affected banks 
and business enterprises. Money supply, particularly currency, inevit­
ably increased. This directly undercut the deflationary policy and 
made it necessary, once the crisis was over, to have an even stiffer 
deflationary policy. 
Data on the net change in Bank of Japan credit during the 1920 1 s 
are presented in Table 6. It did not significantly contract absolute­
ly until 1929-1931; since the economy was growing the net impact was 
deflationary (as evidenced by the decline in wholesale prices in Table 
4). Money supply had a very slightly declining trend during the 1920 1 s 
before dropping off sharply in 1930 and 1931; to some extent this was 
offset by an increase in income velocity. 33 The persisting deficit in 
the current account of the balance of payments, together with the con­
tinued loss of foreign exchange reserves, indicates that the deflation 
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Table 6 
Increases in Bank of Japan Credit (million yen) 
To Private SectorTo To Finance Gold and 
Year Government Total Loans Other Other Reservesa Totalb 
1909-1913 28 - 139 1 -138 168 57 
1914-1919 -2123 1,551 559 992 1,701 1,129 
1920 431 - 678 -481 -197 127 - 116 
1921 91 91 139 - 48 - 75 107 
1922 478 - 227 176 -403 - 239 12 
1923 27 289 303 - 14 171 145 
1924 246 - 168 -130 - 38 - 119 - 41 
1925 279 - 220 - 26 -194 - 90 - 31 
1926 154 - 156 -llO - !i6 - 60 ·- 62 
1927 - 15 208 306 - 98 - 80 113 
1928 236 - 107, - 44 - 63 - 72 57 
1929 - 148 - 94 -169 75 144 - 98 
1930 159 19 74 - 55 - 383 - 205 
1931 212 85 210 -125 - 403 - 106 
1932 75 - 168 -192 24 3 96 
1933 165 12 84 - 72 - 59 118 
1934 66 17 21 - 4 0 83 
1935 85 18 - 35 53 36 139 
1936 229 - 176 - 97 - 79 46 99 
a: Foreign exchange reserves are here consolidated to the Bank of Japan so that 
credit to the government was for domestic purposes. The changes in credit 
for foreign exchange reserves (the mirror image of changes in reserves them­
selves) had their impact directly on the private sector. 
b: Equivalent to changes in Bank of Japan currency issue outstanding. 
Sources: Bank of Japan, Hundred Year Statistics of the Japanese Economy; data 
on foreign exchange reserves from Table 3, 
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was not sufficient until 1929-1930--at which point the Great Depres­
sion completely changed the game and its rules. 
A serious problem of a deflation is that it creates large amounts 
of bad debts. A financial crisis does so, too. The purpose is to 
encourage greater efficiency in given uses of resources, to reallocate 
resources to more efficient uses, and to squeeze out inefficient users. 
However, it is not clear that deflation does not penalize firms which 
may simply be illiquid (because of rapid growth, or descrimination in 
credit markets, or small size) rather than basically inefficient. 
Certainly there is no clear evidence that the incidence of financial 
crisis falls more heavily on the inefficient and the uncompetitive than 
on others who are unlucky in location, in financing connections, in 
liquidity position. It is a tricky operation to estimate what is really 
bad debt in the sense that underlying assets have a lower value than 
liabilities, both immediately and even if the economy were growing. 
Neither severe deflation nor inflation are good allocators of resources; 
moreover, both have undesirable income distribution effects. 
The Bank of Japan's greatest success in the 1920 1 s was in over­
coming the potential financial chaos which the Great Earthquake engen­
dered by destroying not only housing and businesses but by putting 
the Tokyo financial system out of operation. The Bank of Japan immed­
iately agreed to provide virtually unlimited loans to affected banks, 
and thus businesses, by discounting commercial paper which came to be 
34
known as "earthquake bills." The government guaranteed the B.nnk of 
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Japan against loss to 100 million yen, in effect absorbing part of any 
eventual net loss from inability of business borrowers to repay. 
There was a feeling during the 1920's that somehow the bad debts 
from the excesses of the World War I boom had never been written off, 
and to them had been added bad debts in the form of the remaining earth­
quake bills for which there were no underlying assets, as well as a 
cumulation of bad debts from each successive financial crisis. Some-
how all this had to be cleaned up. One proposal in early 1927 was that 
the government go ahead and provide financial aid to buy up and write off 
the outstanding earthquake bills rather than extend their life by another 
year. In the course of public discussion it became known that certain 
large banks, notably the Bank of Taiwan and the Fifteenth (Peers) Bank, 
which held earthquake bills, appeared in unsound condition due to hav­
ing large loans outstanding to borrowers who appeared unable to pay. 
A monetary panic ensued in the spring of 1927. It was of much 
larger proportions than had ever occurred before. Not just small banks 
were involved, but large banks of impeccable credentials. At the core 
of the scandal was the BEnk of Taiwan, a semi-official bank of the 
government with power of banknote issue for Taiwan. 
The Bank of Taiwan was an extreme case of a higly growth-oriented 
financial institution, willing to incur high risks in gambling on con­
tinued prosperity of the Japanese economy and especially its major 
borrowers. Earlier in the 1920 1 s it had decided to expand aggressively 
by lending in Japan rather than restricting its operations to Taiwan. 
40. 
It lent especially to the rapidly growing Suzuki conglomerate, which. 
was based on extensive commercial interests in and with Taiwan, but which 
sought further growth in undertaking various manufacturing activities in 
Japan. While deposits at the Bank had been at the level of its loans 
during World War I, from 1919 on deposits declined sharply to only 23 
per cent of the 1918 peak in 1926, and less in 1927. In contrast, loans 
expanded by 66 per cent over the same period. This loan expansion was 
financed primarily by call loans to the Bank of Taiwan from large banks 
in Japan. 
In early 1927 it appeared possible that Suzuki was overextended. 
Not only could it not repay loans, but some of its operations had liabil­
ities greater than assets--the collateral for a portion of its loans 
was worthless, even though termed "earthquake bills." The banks lending 
call funds to the Bank of Taiwan recalled them. The Bank of Japan was 
unwilling to extend emergency loans without government guarantee against 
losses due to accepting worthless collateral. This took time, and po­
litical machinations in the Diet were disruptive. The Bank of Taiwan, 
the Fifteenth Bank, and other banks, large and small, had to close their 
doors. The run was on. 
Public fear this time was not restricted to a particular local­
ity, or to small banks. Everyone wanted cash. The Bank of Japan re­
sponded valiantly, increasing its loans from 539 million to 1484 mil­
lion yen in a few weeks; correspondingly, Bank of Japan currency in 
circulation rose by 50 per cent. But even this was not enough. A 
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three week bank moratorium was declared on April 22, 1927. Many banks 
failed. Others, including the Fifteenth, had to be merged. 
The extent of the financial crisis of 1927 severely frightened the 
monetary authorities; they haven't gotten over it yet. They determined 
to press ahead with the elimination of as many of the small banks as 
possible by merger with each other or with larger banks. A new banking 
act, raising the minimum capital requirement and making possible great­
er supervision, was passed in 1927. As Table 5 indicates, the number 
of banks dropped sharply after 1927, and average net worth per bank 
increased as sharply. It had been decided that the way to strengthen 
the system was to centralize it, to eliminate the presumably weakest 
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elements. In this way the Bank of Japan could more readily step in 
and help individual banks in times of crisis, and thereby prevent the 
development of panics. Nothing was done, however, to insure deposits 
for the benefit of depositors, or to restrict the proportion of loans 
(relative, say, to net worth) of a single bank going to single firm or 
group of interrelated firms. 
The Bank of Japan was not alone in trying to stem the chronic 
financial instability of the 1920's. The government took a vigorous 
role, not just in guaranteeing at times the financial system against 
losses due to default on discounted paper, but also in its own lend­
ing activities. It used the government-dominated special long-term 
credit banks, notably the Industrial Bank and Hypothec Bank, to extend 
relief loans in emergencies. These loans came essentially from funds 
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amassed by the Ministry of Finance's Deposit Bureau through postal sav­
ings, government bond issue, and government budgetary surpluses. Such 
loans constituted an important component of the relief packages put to­
gether when panics occurred, For example, in the 1920 crLsis as much as 
40 per cent of the Industrial Bank's loans were for the relief of large 
. 36enterprises. While there undoubtedly was a bias in the government's 
relief programs in favor of big business, some loans were made to smal­
ler firms, particularly in the 1927 debacle. 
In part because monetary policy was pre-occupied with the instabil­
ity of the financial system, fiscal measures were importantly relied upon 
to implement the deflationary policy. This was also consistent with 
the legacy of budgetary orthodoxy that prevailed in Japaq as elsewhere, 
in the 1920's. The basic estimates of government expenditures and re­
venues37 are presented in Table 7, and pertinent ratios in Table 8. 
The decrease in government expenditures relative to net domestic pro­
duct between 1921 and 1925 is impressive, as is the even sharper use in 
the next three years, the abrupt decline in 1929-1930 (especially at the 
central level), and the rapid rise in 1931-1932. Thereafter the growth 
of government expenditures was outstripped by the growth of net domestic 
product. Interestingly, the total government sector ran deficits con­
tinuously from 1926, while the central government deficit between 1927-
1929 turned to surplus in 1930-1931, before turning again to deficits. 
This suggests that fiscal policy had a deflationary impact until the mid-
1920's, but was more or less expansive thereafter except for 1929-1931. 
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Table 7 
Consolidated Central Plus Local Government Expenditures and 
Revenues (million yen) 
Government Expenditure Government 
Revenue 
Government Note: Central 
Surplus or Government .Year Total Militarya Investmentb Total SavingsC Deficit Surplus 
(1) (2) (3) (4) ( 5) (6) (7) 
1910 680 186 167 697 184 17 78 
1911 828 206 214 803 189 - 25 17 
1912 696 201 185 803 292 107 138 
1913 682 192 186 813 317 131 149 
1914 698 222 165 782 248 84 94 
1915 657 240 143 768 254 111 97
1916 661 273 139 894 372 233 204 
1917 897 391 207 1,118 428 221 190 
1918 1,250 641 270 1,358 377 108 65 
1919 1,817 981 432 1,864 479 47 31 
1920 2,350 940 685 1,902 237 -448 -383 
1921 2,404 842 681 2,163 440 -241 -160 
1922 2,487 693 756 2,489 758 2 36 
1923 2,331 530 747 2,256 672 - 75 - 14 
1924 2,425 487 778 2,465 818 4o 47 
1925 2,351 448 753 2,535 937 184 202 
1926 2,503 437 872 2,445 814 - 58 78 
1927 2,837 494 878 2,456 497 -381 - 93
1928 3,148 519 865 2,574 291 -574 -173 
1929 2,912 497 871 2,518 477 -394 -156 
1930 2,438 444 608 2,121 291 -317 265 
1931 2,690 462 545 2,045 -100 -645 50 
1932 3,076 705 631 2,077 -368 -999 -473 
1933 3,384 886 679 2,209 -496 -1,175 -470 
1934 3,309 953 632 2,543 -134 - 766 -547 
1935 3,550 1,043 647 2,715 -188 - 835 -561 
1936 3,684 1,089 687 2,978 - 19 - 706 -385 
1937 5,788 3,299 755 4,286 -747 -1,502 -2,047
1938 8,007 5,984 901 4,107 -2,999 -3,900 -3,799
1939 8,778 6,495 1,167 4,785 -2,826 -3,993 -3,992 
1940 11,711 7,967 1,472 6,510 -3,729 -5,201 -4,588 
Note: Expenditures consist of purchases of goods and services plus current subsidies 
and transfers to the private sector. 
a: Narrowly defined to exclude military .. pensions and interest on the government debt. 
b: Excludes all military investment; all military expenditures are regarded as current. 
c: Government revenues minus the sumof government current purchases of goods and ser-
vices, subsidies and transfers. 
d: Government revenues minus expenditures (Col. 4 - Col. l); by definition it also is 
government savings minus investment (Col. 5 - Col. 3). 
Source: Ern.i and Shinoya, Government Expenditures, Vol. 7, LTES. Data in Col. 7 for 
1930-40 are based on general account revenues in Prime Minister's office, Japan Sta-. 
tistical Yearbook 1950 (Tokyo: 1951). 
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Table 8 
Ratios of Military to Total Expenditures and of Government
Expenditures to Net Domestic Product (in per cent) 
Military Expenditures to
Central and Central PlusCentral Local Govern- Central to Local to NetGovernment ment Expendi- Net Domes-Net Domestic DomesticYear Expenditure tures Product tic Product Product 
1910 43.5 '27 .4 5.8 13.2 21.01911 42,5 24.9 5.3 12,5 21.31912 49.9 28.9 4.6 9.1 15.81913 46.6 28.2 4.2 9.1 15.01914 50.9 5.431.8 10.5 16.8
1915 57.7 36.5 5.6 9,7 15.41916 65.2 41.3 5.1 7.8 12.4
1917 64.7 43.6 5.3 8.2 12.2
1918 73.0 51.3 6.1 8.4 12.0
1919 76.2 54.o 7,7 10.l 14.3
1920 60.5 40.0 7.1 11.7 17.81921 56.2 6.735.0 11.9 19.01922 48.4 27.9 5.4 11.2 19.41923 39,7 22.7 4.0 10.l 17,71924 33.9 20.l 3.4 10.0 16.9
1925 34.2 19.l 3.0 8.8 15.81926 31.6 17.5 3.0 9.6 17,31927 30.3 12.4 3.4 11.2 19.41928 29.4 16.5 3,6 12.1 21.61929 29,5 17.1 3,5 11.8 20.4
1930 41.7 18.2 3,6 8.7 18.91931 34.9 17.2 4.1 11.6 21.91932 39.1 22.9 5,5 14.2 22.91933 46.o 26.2 6.1 13,3 21.51934 48.3 28.8 6.3 13.0 21.3
1935 50,7 29.4 6.3 12.5 20.71936 52.0 29.6 5,9 11.4 19,31937 77.3 57,0 15.4 19.9 26.91938 92.0 74,7 25.023.0 30.81939 88.3 74.o 19.3 21.9 26.1
1940 85,9 68.o 21.2 24.7 31.1 
Sources: Table 7 and net domestic product data underlying Table 1. 
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The change in composition of expenditures in the 1920 1 s is strik­
ing. Military expenditures dropped sharply on an absolute basis, and even 
more sharply relative to total government expenditures and to net domestic 
product. This was possible because of the Washington Conference of 1922, 
which not only forestalled an imminent arms race but also provided the 
basis for a Japanese security policy of "armament reduction and coopera­
1138tion with the Western powers. Government investment expenditures, for 
public works, etc., rose, as did current expenditures for non-military 
purposes. 
The government's spasmodic use of fiscal and monetary measures 
during the 1920 1 s not only were not sufficient in deflationary effect 
to restore balance of payments equilibrium and the exchange rate at pre­
war parity, but resulted in a general malaise in the economy. The lS-
27 financial crisis at home, and the return of all the major Western 
powers to the gold standard by 1928 was too much. The pressures in 
Japan to resolve the gold standard problem once and for all finally 
came to a boil. The drift had continued too long. The chronic instabil­
ity of the domestic financial system and of domestic economic performance 
seemed somehow tied up with the government's prolonged failure to take care 
of the matter. 
Businessmen producing for foreign trade and foreign traders felt that 
exchange rate fluctuation, which had become much more erratic in the 
spring of 1928 due to the troubles in China was detrimental to business, 
39since it increased the risk of the profitability of foreign trade. 
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Large banks had come out of the 1927 crisis with large amounts of sur­
plus funds; deposits had accrued to them and they became somewhat con­
servative in lending to Japanese business. They wanted to make liquid 
investments in the United States as interest rates there rose during 
1928 and most of 1929. Annumber of banks did so in large amounts, and 
at a market exchange rate which was below parity. The banks were anxious 
to see Japan return to the gold standard at the old parity not only to 
be protected from possible losses due to exchange rate fluctuation but also 
to make an exchange profit on short-term funds held abroad. 
Ministry of Finance officials were worried about the 230 million 
yen sterling debt falling due between July 1930-January 1931. They 
wanted to refund it by new debt issue, but apparently financial houses 
in London and New York were unwilling to underwrite a new government 
bond issue unless Japan displayed its credit-worthiness by following 
sensible economic policies--including return to a gold standard fixed 
exchange rate. 
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Japan still had fairly large foreign exchange reserves 
(1,199 million yen at the end of 1928), and most (1,084 million yen) 
was held at home in the form of gold. 
It is difficult to disentangle this concatenation of forces to 
determine what were the most important reasons. It probably was quite 
natural that the Hamaguchi Cabinet coming into power in July, 1929, 
would announce a decision to return to the gold standard, at the pre­
war par, at the earliest possible date. The decision was based on an 
expectation that some domestic adjustment would be necessary, but it 
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would not be great because of continued prosperity for the world econ­
omy. Prior to the decision several economic commentators urged a re­
turn to gold at a lower parityJ around $40/100 yen. Their views were 
brushed off by those making the decision. Apparently the feeling pre­
41vailed that devaluation would be a shameful affront to national honor. 
Japan's exchange rate was then pegged at $4-5/100 yen, and its 
wholesale price level was at about 165 (1913 = 100), still substantial­
ly above England and the United States. A precondition for returning 
to the gold standard was to push down Japan's price level sufficiently, 
and thereby the market determined exchange rate would normally move up 
to the desired parity level. 
An orthodox approach was implemented: an austere fiscal and some­
what restrictive monetary policy, with main reliance, symbolically and 
in terms of its economic impact, on the former. Government expenditures 
were cut, while tax rates were maintained. The Bank of Japan did not 
raise its discount rate, but reduced to loans. A serious difficulty 
for monetary policy was that the banking system was so liquid as a re­
sult of Bank of Japan liberal steps in the 1927 crisis; this reduced 
subsequent Bank of Japan control. Interest rates reversed a tendency 
to drift downwards. The government also aided industries in the pro­
cess of cost-cutting, already underway. 
The policy was successful in terms of its objectives. The whole­
sale price index declined by 6 per cent in six months, and continued to 
drop sharply in 1930 (though in part as a result of the transmission of 
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the world depression to Japan). The foreign exchange rate quickly 
moved up to par. Moreover, foreign exchange reserves increased sig­
nificantly, This resulted not only because of the actions taken by the 
government but also due to the expectations thus generated. Speculators 
saw the opportunity and bought yen (for foreign currency); the inflow 
of short-term capital was substantial. Foreign traders postponed the 
purchase of imports and rushed exports. Both of these helped to push 
up .the yen exchange .rate. However, both these forces were temporary and 
. -inherently to be r6verse.d ...once the gold standard was· reattained; to the 
·· extent that· they were significant they resulted in an overestimation of 
the-true re-st.oration of Japau-1 s competi.tive position. As it tu.rned .out,... 
··this ··probably di.d not·matter too much, becausa Japan 1 s competitive po.:. 
- -sit.ion was due to be-severely eroded and its gold standard status under· 
-irresistible attack from the rapid deterioration of the international eco.,;. 
:nomy and thereby the institutional environmentfor world trade .and capi- -
tal flows in 1930-1931.. -
· I have argued that it wils a fundamental mistake to return to the 
gold t:tandard at the prewar parity anytime in the 1920 1 s, The defla­
tionary burden, the costs in tenns. of economic growth, the social and 
--pol.itica.l -effects in terms of income redistribution, distress and .ten­
sions, wcrl:! all too great., More·ovtllr, by coincidence, the timing of 
,Japan's return to the___gold standArd (on January 11, 1930) could not 
.have..been worse: the world economy had just ~gun to toboggan· down 
on the most serious And extended adversi-t.y it has ever had to suffer. 
Unfortunately, the Japanese did not realize that; New York's stock 
market crash appeared only a temporary set-back. 
World prices declined sharply (see Table 4); accelerated deflation 
in Japan could not keep pace. The bottom fell out of the United States 
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silk market, Japan's single most important export commodity. The 
current account of the balance of payments was in deficit. On a net 
basis long-term capital flowed out rather than in. Even worse was the 
tremendous outflow of short-term capital. Speculators, who previously 
felt confident that Japan could go onto the gold standard, now felt 
equally sure that, because of the changed world environment, Japan could 
not remain on the gold standard. Many large banks and trust companies, 
and eventually wealthy individual investors, participated in these short­
term capital outflows, for both interest rate differential and specula• 
tive reasons. Speculation against the yen was enhanced when England 
went off the gold standard in September, lS:31. Gold poured out of the 
country--some 675 millions worth. Overall Japan lost 7G6 million yen 
(5G.5 per cent) of its foreign exchanges reserves in the brief period 
it was on the gold standard. At the same time the Japanese economy was 
sinking into the slough of depression, due both to the deflationary 
policies and to the impact of the c0llapsing world economy. 
It was inevitable that Japan should go off the gold standard, as 
it did in December, 1931. What followed probably could not have been 
anticipated: one of the most brilliant and highly successful combina­
tions of fiscal, monetary, and foreign exchange rate policies, in an 
adverse international environment, that the world has ever seen. The 
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basic decision was to generate incomes and demand at home by large­
scale deficit financing and easy money, and to let the balance of pay­
ments take care of itself by allowing the exchange rate to depreciate as 
much as necessary. This would encourage exports and discourage imports, 
both desirable for domestic expansion. The crucial decision was to for­
sake the interrelated objectives of a) being on the gold standard, and 
b) having the yen exchange at its prewar parity. Adherence to this ob­
jective was the ultimate cause of the difficulties of the 1920's. Its 
repudiation removed the major obstacle to expansionary fiscal and mone­
tary policies to get out of depression and once again start on rapid 
growth. l'.~3 
The only effective way for an industrial country to come out of 
(excess capacity) depression is to spend its way out. In this the gov­
ernment has to take the lead, since business expectations are ususally 
quite pessimistic about the future. The Japanese government pursued 
this approach with great vigor and success. For 1931-33, government 
expenditures increased by 26 per cent, and net domestic product grew 
at a comparable rate. Probably equijlly important, three-quart~rs of the 
rise in government expenditures was deficit-financed; tax revenues were 
held down, providing a multiplicative effect on private demand (Table 
7). Throughout the 1930 1 s the government ran large deficits--sufficient­
ly large that revenues did not even cover current purchases of goods and 
services and transfer payments (i.e., government saving was negative). 
Significantly, almost three-fifths of the increase in government 
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expenditures during the 1930 1 s prior to the outbreak of the war with 
China in 1937 was for military uses. Much of the increase followed 
immediately upon the Manchurian Incident of 1931. We have fairly de­
tailed functional estimates only for central government expenditures 
in certain benchmark years. Between 1930 and 1935, of the 946 million 
yen increase in central government expenditures, 62 per cent was for 
military uses, 14 per cent for social welfare, 7 per cent for trans­
portation, agriculture and other economic services, and 17 per cent 
l:-t+
for interest on the expanding national debt. 
Monetary policy was an important complement to fiscal policy, though 
as probably is inevitable in a depression it was less important since 
financial institutions were wary of lending to business. The Bank of 
Japan probably should.have taken positive steps to increase commercial 
bank reserves rather than standing ready to rediscount upon request. Since ~ 
requests were limited, as shown in Table 6, it did not expand credit great­
ly to the private sector. Money supply increased only moderately until 
1937. What the Bank of Japan did do was to underwrite the government 
bond issues from 1932 on. It purchased outright that portion not sub­
scribed to by the Ministry of Finance Deposit Bureau. As government de­
ficit-financed expenditures resulted in an increase in commercial bank 
deposits, banks were eager to purchase government bonds from the Bank of 
Japan until the mid-1S30 1 s when they began, once again, to engage in pri­
vate lending. The Bank of Japan lowered its discount rate far below any 
previous minimum level, to 3.29 per cent in 1~36 as compared with 6.57 
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per cent at the end of 1931. The average yield on government bonds de­
creased from 6.0 to 3.9 per cent between 1932 and 1936; the commercial 
bank average lending rate did not decline so much, form 5.8 to 4.6 per 
cent. Lowered interest rates and easy money abetted the rapid recovery 
and the new surge of growth that was soon underway. 
The foreign exchange rate plummeted as soon as Japan left the gold 
standard, hitting the pre-World War II low relative to the dollar of $20.70/ 
100 yen in December, 1932. The pound was also depreciating relative to the 
dollar. At the end of 1933, the Japanese government decided to peg the 
yen to the pound, but at a rate some L:-3 per cent below what it had been 
when both yen and pound had been on the gold standard (see Table Li-). This 
was a major net depreciation in a world of depreciating currencies. 
The effect on Japanese exports of drastically reduced prices in 
terms of foreign currencies was highly beneficial; exports increased 
rapidly. The net effect on the world was probably beneficial too be­
cause, with the balance of payments constraint lifted, Japan grew more 
rapidly and thereby increased its demand for imports. Nonetheless, ex­
change rate depreciation was sufficiently large that Japan's trade ba­
lance tended to improve; its balance on current account moved to surplus 
and remained so until 1937. There is some merit in the criticism that 
Japan pursued a beggar-my-neighbor policy; in the world economy at that 
time, though, neighbors had to look out for themselves. 
The success of this period of Japanese economic policy, despite a 
much more difficult world environment as compared with the 1930's, is 
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manifested in the rapid economic growth wfuich occurred once the new 
policies were undertaken (see Table 1). But this success occurred too 
late. By 1936 the military were entrenched in a strong power position, 
perhaps impossible to dislodge. As the economy approached capacity op­
eration in 1936, it became desirable to slow down the expansion of govern­
ment expenditures. This was, of course, in conflict with the desires of 
the military. The assassination on February 25, 1936, of Finance Min­
ister Takahashi, who had so ably guided Japan through its "reflation" 
period, marked the end of any possibility of restoring power to the 
business-political parties group. The expansive fiscal and monetary 
policies were to continue, and increasingly strict direct controls to 
be imposed, as Japan went onto wartime footing first to fight China 
and eventually the United States. 
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It remains to explore in this section some broader implications of Japan's 
interwar economic performance, and to raise questions if not provide answers. A 
fundamental question is: to what extent did economic factors, and just what 
factors, cause Japan to choose, or stumble onto, the path it did which led to 
militarism and war? In raising this issue I do not want to grapple with the 
broader problem of historical interpretation: whether Japan's path in the 1930's 
was an aberration from the basic trend of the democratic, modernization process 
of the 1920's and earlier and renewed after World War II; or whether it was a 
natural, likely, perhaps virtually inevitable consequence of the social and 
political stresses and strains emanating from the very process of modernization. 
Nonetheless, with the gradual passing away of the Meiji oligarchy, the 
1920's presented an opportunity for nascent parliamentary democracy, based on 
business-oriented political parties, to display its ability as a system to sus­
tain relatively rapid economic growth, to overcome or at least ameliorate the 
tensions of growth, and to cope with the country's security objectives. The 
basic policy stance of the governments of the 1920's was internationalist, of 
cooperation in the world order of the West. Economically this meant the early 
postwar restoration of multilateral, relatively free trade and of a gold stan­
dard fixed exchange rate system, together with free movement of short-term and 
long-term capital. National secuirty was also met by cooperation with the West, 
including general acceptance of the status quo, which implied Japanese hegemony 
in East Asia. In this international environment, created in large part by the 
Washington Conference of 1922 and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, it was possible to re­
trench on armaments and overall military expenditures. 
The internationalist policy of the 1920's failed, and with it parliamentary 
democracy and political parties failed the test opportunity presented. I do not 
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mean to imply that this was the only test, or that failure inevitably signalled 
the effective end of the party system; those judgments are for political his­
torians to make. Nor do I mean that the military immediately and directly took 
over; their encroachment was less rapid until 1936 or 1937, It is obvious that 
the failure was in large part attributable to economic causes. Two such fac­
tors, one exogenous and the other endogenous, were critical: the breakdown, 
with the Great Depression, of the world economic order; and the mediocre per­
formance of Japan's economy in the 1920's. 
The collapse of the world economy, in addition to sharply lowering total 
demand for internationally traded goods, shifted the emphasis away from free 
trade to increasing trade restrictions, from multilateralism to increasing bi­
lateralism, from fixed exchange rates based on parity with gold to fluctuating, 
competitively depreciating exchange rates unlinked to gold and brought an end 
to long-term capital lending. In this new international game with new rules 
Japan played superlatively. The exchange rate and the balance of payments were 
no longer a constraint on domestic economic growth. It is ironic that at the 
time when Japan's international economic performance, operating in world mar­
kets, was so successful, the domestic swing in its policy stance was towards 
autarchy. 
The very success of Japan's international economic performance between 
1932 and 1936 suggests that we should attribute the dominant economic factor in 
the failure of parliamentary democracy to the distinct lack of success of macro 
economic policy prior to 1932. Japanese policymakers succeeded only in ex­
acerbating social tensions, not in ameliorating them. 
The off-again-on-again deflationary policy of the 1920's was clearly a 
calamitous mistake. An acceptance of, say, the 1922 level of prices as reason­
able, a correspondingly appropriate exchange rate adjustment, and the return 
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then to the gold standard would, by hindsight, have been much more efficacious. 
The domestic economy would not have needed to be subjected to the continual 
buffeting it received, and could have gone about its business of growth. This 
fundamental error -- to return to gold at the prewar par -- was compounded by 
the cataclysmic timing of the actual re-establishment of the prewar parity in 
returning to the gold standard at the beginning of 1930. Incidentally, big 
business by speculating against the yen in 1930 and 1931 succeeded in under­
cutting the very basis of their political power. From then on, they would have 
increasingly to make deals directly with the military. 
The alternative to internationalism was decreased reliance on the West 
and, eventually, on autarkic bloc economy. Not surprisingly the proponents of 
this option were the military, who saw the issues primarily in security rather 
than economic terms. They were apprehensive over the London Naval Treaty of 
1930, whereby it appeared national security was being compromised for the sake 
45of budgetary retrenchment and adherence to the gold standard. The military 
leaders were not a bunch of wild-eyed, righ-wing, young conspirators intent 
upon a coup by which they could manipulate ministers of state. They, and those 
from all elements of Japan's broadly defined elite who supported them, were on 
the whole reasonable, responsible men making relatively conscious, mostly in­
cremental decisions based on their perceptions of the changing world and the 
options available. In the perceptions of the militarists and many others the 
internationalist approach had failed by 1931, for both foreign and domestic 
reasons. They proposed what they considered to be superior alternatives. This is 
not to say that the military were wholly altrustic; they too were elitist and 
presumptuous, contemptuous of parliamentary democracy. The expenditures re­
trenchments of the 1920's, predicted upon absolute cut-backs of personnel and 
restrictions upon armament aims, disturbed the military greatly. They had been 
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used to a greater share of the central government budget and of GNP, and of 
attendant political power, and they wanted "their share" back. 
But suppose the foreign exchange rate--balance of payments problem had been 
solved in the early 1920's and the economy had grown more rapidly and more stably. 
Would that have resolved the difficulties inherent in the differential structure? 
It probably would have done no more than ameliorate them--but perhaps that would 
have been enough. More rapid growth would have been mainly in the industrial 
sector; with the stable prices there would probably have been less substitution 
of capital and labor. Together these would have meant a greater absorption of 
unskilled labor into manufacturing, as indeed occurred during the 1930's. But 
the unskilled-skilled wage differential would have remained. Would this relative 
deprivation of the unskilled have led to their discontent? Or was it the in­
ability to find factory jobs, the absolute decline in money wages which were the 
real issues generating so much friction? I suspect it was the latter. 
The real difficulty, even with successful industrial performance, could 
well have been agriculture. There the differential structure would likely have 
remained. A lower exchange rate and a stable price, instead of the deflationary 
policy, would have made for more favorable price incentives for agriculture than 
existed. Silk incomes, in yen, would have been even higher, but still subject 
to the precipitous decline in world prices after 1926. Rice was imported from 
the colonies which were on the yen standard, so exchange rate devaluation would 
not have helped. The policy of importing cheap rice was in principle efficient 
in the long run since resources in Japanese agriculture should be transferred 
into manufacturing. But the rub was in the long time it would take these re­
sources--particularly labor--to be absorbed in manufacturing. It simply could 
not have been achieved quickly enough to prevent a long adjustment period of 
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agrarian relative deprivation and, presumably, discontent. The government was 
on the horns of an income distribution dilemma: a relatively high price of rice 
and other foodstuffs would maintain, and enhance, incomes in agriculture, but at 
the expense of the discontent of urban workers and capitalists. But an import 
program, while helping urban owrkers and their employers, hurt farm incomes. How­
ever, a better pricing policy would at least have prevented agricultural incomes 
from declining absolutely. 
Even if better price incentives had existed for agriculture, it is not 
clear that this alone would have been sufficient to increase productivity in agri­
culture at the rate at which it had been growing between 1885 and 1919, It seems 
inevitable that a differential structure emerges in the phase of the industriali­
zation process when the demand for skilled labor outstrips supply and large re­
servoirs of unskilled labor remain. Until the industrial sector is large enough 
and growing rapidly enough to absorb large amounts of unskilled workers, their 
wages will not increase substantially. Perhaps social tensions are bound to 
increase during this phase of development because of the observable differences 
in income received by capitalists, by skilled workers, and by farmers and un­
skilled non-farm workers. 
The problem then for the ruling government in an industrializing nation is 
how to keep these tensions within bounds, to ameliorate conditions such that 
military coups, or revolutions, do not occur. At the least, the real incomes of 
large groups cannot be allowed to fail absolutely. More positively, the real 
incomes of the surplus labor (notably that in agriculture) may well have to rise 
somewhat, though less than that of capitalists or of skilled labor. Minimum 
wage-type legislation will not achieve this. It may even be difficult, and per­
haps undesirable from the developmental process of mobilizing savings, to move 
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the agricultural-manufacturing terms of trade in favor of agriculture. Essen­
tially, the only hope seems to lie in raising productivity, output, and hence 
real income in agriculture. 
Objective economic conditions are important not only in themselves but 
particularly as they affect the perceptions, objectives and tactics of those in 
political power and those attempting to achieve power. For Japan this involved 
on the one hand the political activities of various economic interest groups-­
such as "old" and "new" zaibatsu, workers, landlords, small land owning-cultivat­
ing farmers, tenants, and whatever organizations they had--and on the other hand 
the concern with economic issues, and economic bases of (economic and political) 
support of the various political actors--parties, various strata of the Army and 
Navy, etc. We should separate the influence of economic difficulties on the 
objectives of political actors from their capitalizing upon these difficulties 
as a means of attaining power. Objectively, some of the economic issues of the 
late 192O's and early 193O's were false, though probably not entirely so in 
the perceptions of the important political actors. 
Much more analysis is needed of the perceptions by the political actors 
of the economic realities of interwar Japan. For example, the military per­
ception that the basic conflict involving agriculture was the capitalists versus 
the farmer, rather than the landlord versus the tenant, is highly revealing. 
So were military and bureaucracy perceptions of the foreign trade environments, 
particularly the evolving feeling that world prices for many imports they needed 
for military purposes were rigged by international cartels and that they simply 
could not obtain sufficient foreign exchange for their (expanding) definition 
of minimum military requirements. Increasingly they came to feel that the only 
viable alternative was for Japan to develop its own bloc economy in a relatively 
autarkic manner. The complexities of these issues suggest that we need to 
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explore the varying relationships among big business, the political parties, 
the bureaucracy and the military--and the degree to which these relationships 
were affected by economic causes--before we can assess fully the extent to which 
economic factors, and which factors, were responsible for Japan's taking the 
militaristic path of the 1930's. 
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4. Ohkawa and Johnston cite these, together with a reduced potential fortechnological advance in the agricultural structure of small farms andsubstantial tenantry, as the major causes of the slowdown. See KazushiOhkawa and Bruce F. Johnston, "The Transferability of the JapanesePattern of' Modernizing Traditional Agriculture," Universities-NEER Con­ference on the Role of' Agriculture in Economic Development, December 1-2,1967, Table 1. 
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8. Jung-Chao Liu and Daniel B. Suits, "An Inter-Regional Model of the RiceMarket in the Japanese Empire," Discussion Paper, Research Seminar inQuantitative Economics, University of Michigan, July 1959. 
62. 
9. Prices of silk tended to fluctuate more than agricultural commoditiesin tote, rising more during the World War I boom, falling more between1925 and 1931, and rising more thereafter. This makes it particularlydifficult to determine a 11 normal 11 base year. 
10. This is computed by applying the percentage decline in agricultural prices(excluding silk weighted at 10 per cent) to the 1925 silk price and mul­tiplying it by the quantity produced. This figure is compared with thevalue when the actual price decline is used. 
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12. Irene B. Taeuber, The Population of Japan (Princeton: Princeton Univer­sity Press, 1958), p. 87. 
13. If we assume the same industrial definitions for the population censusand the census of factory manufacturing, then of the 264,000 increase inemployment in manufacturing between 1920 and 1930, 147,000 was in estab­lishments of four workers or less, 95,000 in firms of 5-99 employees,112,000 in firms of 100-499 employees, and minus 90,000 in firms of 500or more employees. 
14. See Miyohei Shinohara, Growth and Cycles in the Japanese Econorn.,y (Tokyo:Kinokuniya, 1962), pp. 14-16; Koji Taira, "The Dynamics of Japanese WageDifferentials, 1881-1959, 11 Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1961,pp. 74-84, and Konosuke Odaka, "Historical Developments in the Wage­Differential Structure," unpublished manuscript. 
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17, For example, money wages for female cotton textile workers were 0.92 yen/dayin 1922, 0.82 in 1928, thereafter falling sharply to 0,55 in 1932.part mills substituted younger for older girls. 
In
There was substantialturnover of workers; new workers could be and were hired at lower wagerates. 
18. See the comparisons for 1929-31 in W. Arthur Lewis, Economic Survey, 1919-1939 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1949), p. 118. 
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20. See Lewis, .Q.E_, cit., p. 156; Ragnar Nurkse, International Currency Ex­perience (League of Nations, 1944), pp. 116f. 
21. The balance of payments is for the Empire; while the main reason is prag­matic (this is what is what is available) for my purpose it is preferrableto a Japan Proper balance of payments because it contains all transactionswhich involve foreign exchange; since the colonies used yen as currency,current and capital flows between them and Japan had no direct foreign ex­change implications. 
22. Britain and France repaid by the mid-1920's, but Japan had to write off240 million yen in loans to Czarist Russia. 
23. Japan had in effect been on a gold exchange standard since its inceptionin 1897, investing much of its reserves in safe, short-term assets inLondon and New York. 
24. The rate did appreciate somewhat, to a maximum of $51,50 (3.3 per cent)in 1919. 
25. See S.Y. Furuya, Japan's Foreign Exchange and Her Balance of InternationalPayments (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928). The holding ofgold relative to the domestic currency supply rather than balance of pay­ments needs was one of the "rules of the game" of the gold standardsystem. It was a very expensive anachronism of the system carrying overfrom the days of mistrust in banknotes. Japan was not alone in its con­cern; vide United States policy in Autumn 1931. 
26. Ministry of Finance, Kinyu, .212.· cit., p. 157, 
27. A simple application of the purchasing power theory, using a 1922 priceindex of 140 for the United States and 200 for Japan, would suggest a newpar of 100 yen= $34,90. This probably would have been too low, becauseof the increase in industrial capacity in Japan during World War I andthe immense increase in U.S. demand for Japanese silk during the 1920's.However, much of the industrial capacity created during World War I wasin new industries which arose because they temporarily had little foreigncompetition in either domestic or foreign markets, so they could sellhigh-cost goods at high prices. In terms of long-run growth as well asshort-term (war) gains, it probably was desirable to have these industriesdevelop at this time even though they faced considerable difficultiesonce the war ended. The time period for a new industry to become competi­tive was too long for these industries to contribute much to interwar ex­ports until the mid-1930 1 s (and then mainly for Japanese investment inits Empire) or, in some cases, until the mid-1950's. See William V. Rapp,"A Theory of Changing Trade Patterns under Economic Growth: Tested forJapan," Yale Economic Essays, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Fall 1967), pp. 69-135, 
28. Quotas were not in the arsenal of accepted weapons in the 1920 1s, thoughof course in the economic warfare of the 1930's any weapon could be, andwas, used. 
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29. This speculative demand began first in Shanghai in February 1925, andseveral months later was joined by demand from New York. Inouye has someamusing comments on the difference between Chinese and American specu­lators; see Junnosuke Inouye, Problems of the Japanese Exchange, 1914-1926 {London: MacMillan, 1931), pp. 114-126. · 
30. See G.C. Allen, "Japanese Industry: Its Organization and Development to1937," in E.B. Schumpeter, ed., The Industrialization of Japan and Man­chukuo 1930-1940 (New York: MacMillan, 1940), pp. 737-38. 
31. For the 1924-1929 period for which we have data it was only 15.6 per cent;for 1930-31 there was a net outflow of long-term (as well as short-term)capital, in addition to a current account deficit. 
32. See Hugh T. Patrick, "Japan, 1868-1914, 11 in Rondo Cameron et al., Bankingin the Early Stages of Industrialization (New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1967). 
33. The best money supply estimates have been made by Professor ShozaburoFujino; they are not yet published. I rely here on the net domesticproduct estimates underlying Table 1 and Fujino's money supply as ad­justed in W.C. Hoekendorf, 11The Secular Trend of Income Velocity in Japan,1879-1940!' Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1961. 
34. The Bank of Japan rediscounted 431 million yen of earthquake bills, andlarge banks held considerably more, confident of the Bank's guarantee;the total a.mount issued is estimated at 2,100 million yen. All but 276million yen had been paid off by November 1924; this remainder proveddifficult to liquidate (reflecting underlying bad debts); in early 1927,207 million yen remained outstanding, almost half held by the Bank ofJapan. 
35. This also resulted in considerable increase in concentration in the fi­nancial sector. The "Big Five" banks (Yasuda, Mitsubishi, Mitsui,Sumitomo, Daiichi) as a group had only 19.5 per cent of loans and 24.3per cent of deposits of all ordinary banks in 1926; the shares increasedthereafter, to 27.8 per cent and 34.5 per cent respectively in 1929, to30.5 per cent and 40.1 per cent in 1931, and to 39.3 per cent and 42.1per cent in 1937. See Oshima, Nihon Kyoko Shi Ron, p. 284, and Fuji Bank,Banking in Modern Japan (Tokyo: 1961), p. 96. 
36. Kojinishi et al., op. cit., p. 154. 
37. The data are consolidated for central plus local governments; the latterwere dominated by the central government. While the local governmentsran budgetary deficits between 1920 and 1940, central government expendi­tures and revenues (and central government general account expenditures)moved closely with the total in Table 6. 





39. The Yokohama Specie Bank had to change its stated rate for dollars 90times during 1928. In addition, silk spinners were hurt by the season­ality of trade, since they tended to export in the fall {following thespring cocoon crop) when the trade balance tended toward surplus, theexchange rate rose, and the yen proceeds of given dollar sales declined. 
40. A Ministry of Finance official who took a trip abroad between February­May 1929 to survey foreign opinion was advised that Japan should returnto the gold standard, but at a new, lower parity. Ministry of Finance,Kinyu, op. cit., p. 211. 
41. Katsumi Mitani, Kokusai Shushi to Nihon no Seicho (Tokyo: Heibonsha,1957), pp. 228-230. 
42. Silk exports in 1929 were valued at 781 million yen, 36.3 per cent oftotal exports of 2,149 million yen; in 1930 they were 417 million yen,28.4 per cent of much smaller total exports of 1,470 million yen.decline in value of cotton textiles was also substantial. 
The 
43. Professor William Lockwood has suggested that the "brilliance" of macropolicy between 1932 and 1936 may have been little more than a politicalresponse to pressures to expand expenditures (by the military, business,etc.) without raising taxes, rather than a reasoned analysis and under­standing of aggregate demand. The point is well taken though clearlytalk of "reflation" had imbedded in it a vague appreciation of whatsubsequently has been termed Keynesian economics. 
44. Emi and Shionoya, .£12.· cit., pp. 270-273. 
45. See Crowley, .21?.· cit., Chpt. 1. Professor Crowley's thinking on nationalsecurity has strongly influenced mine. 
